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 1 
1 INTRODUCTION  
1.1 Subject of the thesis  
Transporting goods by sea is the most environmentally friendly way to transport goods.
1
 
IMO has estimated that ships involved in global trade during 2007 contributed with around 
2.7% of the world’s CO2
 
emissions.
2
 However, if the legislators take no further actions, a 
mid-range scenario would be that the world’s CO2 emissions would increase by two or 
three times by 2050.
3
 Consequently, there is a need to take immediate actions in order to 
prevent such a scenario.  
 
In order to reach more sustainable and energy efficient operations, both the private and the 
public sector need to take actions. Energy efficiency can be achieved by both technical and 
contractual alterations. The private sector could assist by improving the vessels' energy 
efficiency.  
 
The aim of this thesis is to explore various means of increasing the efficiency of charterpar-
ties, both from an economical and an environmental perspective. When the speed of the 
vessel is reduced, the decrease in bunker consumption is directly proportional to the reduc-
tion of the emissions; seemingly a win-win situation is achieved.
4
 Consequently, both the 
environment and the company paying for the bunkers generally profit from reducing the 
speed of the vessel.
 5
  There are various means of reducing the fuel consumption of a ves-
                                                   
 
1
 Niko Wijnolst, Tor Wergeland, Shipping Innovation, IOS Press BV, Amsterdam, the Netherlands, 2009, 
p.658.  
2
 Second IMO GHG Study 2009, Second IMO GHG Study 2009, International Maritime Organization (IMO) 
London, UK, April 2009. p. 21  
3
 Ibid.  
4
 Christos A. Kontovas and Hariloas N. Psaraftis, The link between economy and environment in the post 
crisis era: lesson learned from slow steaming, Int. J. Decision Sciences, Risk and Management, Vol. 3, Nos. 
3/4, 2011, p.312. 
5
 Erik Røsæg, Minimizing Energy Consumption in Logistics Chains – in Particular a Green Analysis of Port 
Operators’ Responsibilities, in: Environmental Liabilities in Ports and Coastal Areas – Focus on Public Au-
thorities and Other Actors, Ed. Henrik Rak, Peter Wetterstein, Institute of Maritime and Commercial Law 
Åbo Akademi University, CorttiPrint Printing House, Turku, 2011, p. 105.  
 2 
sel. For instance, IMO has implemented the mandatory application of EEDI for newbuild-
ing and SEEMP for all vessels above 400 gross tonnage as of 1 January 2013.
6
 NGOs, such 
as BIMCO and INTERTANKO, have produced various standard clauses on slow steaming 
for voyage
7
 and time
8
 charterparties. In addition, the virtual arrival agreements
9
 target the 
unnecessary rush to port in the event there is a known congestion in the port. It is debated 
whether or not slow steaming will survive after the recession, however, there are experts 
that argue that slow steaming is a sustainable solution for the operators and is likely to con-
tinue to be used also in the future.
10
 
 
From a legal perspective, speed reduction clauses are nonetheless quite complicated. A 
slow steaming clause might be contrary to a “due despatch” obligation in the charterparty 
and in a bill of lading. Consequently, a third party holder of a bill of lading might be able to 
hold the carrier liable for not performing the voyage with due despatch. Moreover, the slow 
steaming clause is preferably to be incorporated into a bill of lading, but the question re-
mains how valid such incorporation clause is due to the mandatory regulatory regime 
which is applicable to bills of lading. In order to properly evaluate the risks and benefits of 
incorporating a speed reduction clause, these issues are assessed in this thesis.   
1.2 Aim of research   
This master thesis was written for University of Oslo, also as part of REBUS Project 2 'Lo-
gistics Networks', financed by FIMECC (Finnish Metals and Engineering Competence 
Cluster) and lead by the Laboratory of Industrial Management, Department of Chemical 
Engineering, Åbo Akademi University, Finland. The aim of this project is to scrutinize the 
relation of Finnish export industry with the sea logistics industry, and to find solutions in 
                                                   
 
6
 IMO, Regulations to improve the energy efficiency of international shipping enter into force, 02.01.2013, 
available at: http://www.imo.org/MediaCentre/PressBriefings/Pages/01-MARPOL-EEDI.aspx (last viewed 
27.10.2014).  
7
 BIMCO Slow Steaming Clause for Voyage Charter Parties, Special Circular no.5, BIMCO (2012).  
8
 BIMCO Slow Steaming Clause for Time Charter Parties, Special Circular no.7, BIMCO (2011).  
9
Virtual Arrival, Optimising Voyage Management and Reducing Vessel Emissions – an Emissions Manage-
ment Framework, OCIMF (2010).  
10
 UNCTAD (2013) Annual Review of Maritime Transport, United Nations Conference on Trade and Devel-
opment (UNCTAD), p. 27.  
 3 
order to enhance the efficiency of the export industry.
11
 My task has been to analyse if 
Finnish charterparties could become more efficient and therefore serve as a tool to improve 
the competitiveness of both the Finnish shipping sector and export industry.
12
 
1.3 Delimitation  
This thesis focuses on contractual considerations in connection with slow steaming but 
generally disregards the technical obstacles to reduce the RPM to a critical level. A thor-
ough analysis of slow steaming from an economical perspective will also not be carried out 
within this thesis research since the existing studies already cover this issue.
13
 Furthermore, 
the harbour operations systems will also not be thoroughly examined, even if the harbour 
system do have a great impact on the vessel’s speed choices, and the lack of efficiency in 
harbours have a negative impact on the environment. 
1.4 Disposition 
In the first part of the thesis, a general background to efficient charterparties is presented. A 
discussion of the balance between freedom of contract and enforcing private parties to im-
pose more environmentally friendly clauses will be followed by a short introduction to the 
most important forms of contracts in the maritime sector. This is followed by a section de-
voted to competition law, ensuring that cooperation to develop speed reduction clauses 
would not be considered as distorting competition. The following section discusses some 
general points on maritime economics and explains why there is a “sudden” interest in slow 
                                                   
 
11
 Åbo Akademi, Åbo Akademi leder mångmiljonprojekt, 2013, available at: 
http://www.abo.fi/public/News/Item/item/7971 (last visited 26.10.2014).  
12
 Finland is dependent on shipping, as 90 % of Finnish export is transported by sea. It is therefore extremely 
essential to ensure the development of the Finnish shipping industry and to guarantee its competitiveness in 
order to have a good export sector. Consequently, the whole logistical chain needs to become more efficient 
in order to maintain its competitiveness. Fairway to the future, the future of shipping in Finland 2015 and 
beyond, PBI Research Institute, January 2013, available at: http://www.pbi-
institute.com/files/32/Varust_Raportti_25042013_GBR_FINAL.pdf (last viewed 25.06.2014), p.2-3.    
13
 Li Xu, The impact of slow steaming practices on cost and emission from shipping, Molde University Col-
lege, 27.05.2014, available at: 
http://brage.bibsys.no/xmlui/bitstream/handle/11250/221520/master_xu.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y, last 
visited 25.10.2014.  
 
 4 
steaming. The last part of the background chapter discusses investment clauses and how 
they could be used in time charterparties in order to share the costs for investing in energy 
efficient solutions. The following chapter is scrutinizing the voyage charterparty concept  
and notice of readiness, which could be in a need of a general revision. The main chapter of 
this thesis is regarding slow steaming and virtual arrival clauses. These clauses have been 
drafted by NGOs and the idea is that they would be voluntarily implemented in charterpar-
ties in order to regulate a speed reduction during a voyage. The chapter is explaining and 
evaluating the standard clauses. Moreover, the intention is also to highlight potential legal 
issues which could arise as a consequence of reducing the speed of the vessel. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 5 
2 LEGAL SOURCES AND METHOD  
There are various types of legal research. The obvious method in legal research is the legal 
dogmatic method, which in its core interprets and systemises legal norms.
14
 The legal dog-
matic method means that the general principles of law is the starting point in order to de-
termine the applicable law on a specific area. Researchers that are applying this method are 
analysing the specific legislation, the preparatory work, case law and the legal doctrine. 
The legal dogmatic method has been applied in order to describe the applicable mandatory 
maritime legislation as well as the rules applying to third party holders of a bill of lading. 
 
Due to a history of a close cooperation between the Nordic countries in regards of the vari-
ous maritime codes,
15
 legal opinions and proposals from the other Nordic countries have a 
great value between the countries. The Nordic solution in the various Maritime Codes en-
acted in Finland,
16
 Sweden,
17
 Norway
18
 and Denmark
19
 created a new system, a mixture 
between the Hague-Visby Rules
20
 and the Hamburg Rules,
21
 without inflicting on the man-
datory rules in the Hague-Visby rules.
22
 Unfortunately, the countries could not agree on 
one coherent numbering system. The Finnish-Swedish system uses of chapters while the 
Norwegian-Danish system implemented sequential paragraph numbering.
23
 The Nordic 
Maritime Codes shall be considered as common Nordic legislation even if there might be 
minor differences in the application of the rules.
24
  Accordingly, a comparative assessment 
                                                   
 
14
 Aleksander Peczenik, On Law and Reason, Law and Philosophy Library, Vol. 8, Springer, 2009, p.13. 
15
 Lars Gorton, Nordic Law in the Early 21st Century – Maritime Law, Stockholm Institute for Scandianvian 
Law, Vol 50, 2007, p.108.  
16
 Finnish Maritime Code 674/1994 (FMC).  
17
 Swedish Maritime Code 1994:1009 (SMC). 
18
 The Norwegian Maritime Code 24 June 1994 no. 39 (NMC).  
19
 Danish Merchant Shipping Act (consolidation). Consolidated act no. 75 of 17 January 2014 issued by the 
Danish Maritime Authority (DMSA). 
20
 Protocol (SDR Protocol) amending the International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of 
Law Relating to Bills of Lading of 25 August 1924 (The Hague Rules), as amended by the protocol of 23 
February 1968 (Visby Rules), 1979 
21
 United Nations Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea (The Hamburg Rules) Hamburg, 30 March 
1978. 
22
 Hugo Tiberg, Styckegodstransport enligt nya sjölagen, SvJT 199, p.325. 
23
 Tiberg, 1995, p.327.  
24
 Gorton, 2007, p.115.  
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of the rules and regulations on due despatch has been applied. Consequently, the Norwe-
gian preparatory work, i.e. NOU 2012:10
25
, is of importance in the de lege ferenda analy-
sis.
26
 Due to the lack of case law on this particular subject in the Nordic countries, also 
none-Nordic cases will be of importance.  
 
In regards of the charterparty clauses, where freedom of contract applies,
27
 a law and eco-
nomic analysis has been used in order to scrutinize the likelihood and willingness of volun-
tarily implementing more energy efficient clauses into charterparties. Due to the de lege 
ferenda assessment, interviews with practitioners in the shipping industry have been carried 
out. Moreover, charterparties with rider clauses and alterations has been collected from 
practitioners. These materials have had a fundamental impact on the thesis. The draft claus-
es have been analysed with the assistance of commentaries from BIMCO and INTER-
TANKO, as well as the general legal doctrine. Newsletters from various law firms and P&I 
Clubs have been of great support where there has been a lack of journals and other legal 
jurisprudence.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
 
25
 NOU 2012:10 Gjennomføring av Rotterdamreglene i sjøloven. 
26
 Peczenik, 2009, p.207. 
27
 Subject to some exceptions.  
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3 BACKGROUND 
3.1 Regulation of environmental issues vs freedom of contract  
Environmental issues are considered important in international carriage of goods. However, 
the present international regimes have not dealt with the issue well enough.
28
 The policy-
makers have so far only encouraged sustainable freight but have not demanded it.
29
  
 
Traditionally, it has been outside the scope of contract law to regulate on protection of the 
environment.
30
 It hasn’t been an issue for the regulators. Lately, it has been questioned if 
transporters might have a mandatory obligation to consider environmental issues when 
concluding contractual agreements within the EU.
31
 Nonetheless, in none of the existing 
conventions and regulations
32
 can such obligations be found.
33
 Not even the not-yet-ratified 
multimodal convention, Rotterdam Rules,
34
 includes any obligation to commercially organ-
ize the transportation as environmentally friendly as possible,
35
 even if some modest at-
tempts to protect the environment are present.
36
 There is no hurdle for the national legisla-
tors to go further than the conventions and increase the emphasis on sustainable interpreta-
tions of maritime transport rules.
37
  
 
According to legal theory, the work behind the international conventions is in line with the 
traditional view on private law.
38
 However, the division between private and public law is 
                                                   
 
28
 Ellen Eftestøl-Wilhelmsson, European Sustainable Freight – The Role of Contract Law, in Evironmental 
Liabilities in Ports and Coastal Areas – Focus on Public Authorities and Other Actors, eds. Henrik Rask and 
Peter Wetterstein,  Institute of Maritime and Commercial Law Åbo Akademi University, 2011, p.241.  
29
 Eftestøl-Wilhelmsson, 2011, p.241.  
30
 Ibid., p.243.  
31
 Ibid., p.234.  
32
 Here having The Hague and Hague-Visby rules, Hamburg rules as well as CMR, CMI and CMNI in con-
sideration.  
33
 Eftestøl-Wilhelmsson. 2011. p.236.  
34
 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly by Sea 
(New York, 2008) (the "Rotterdam Rules"). 
35
 Eftestøl-Wilhelmsson, 2011, p.238.  
36
 Ibid., p.245.  
37
 This will be further discussed in chapter 5.4.3.  
38
 Eftestøl-Wilhelmsson, 2011, p.243.  
 8 
gradually decreasing.
39
 Consequently, many authors argue that a new approach to law is 
needed. Presently, sustainable arguments are not a part of the current transport conventions. 
One can argue that such issues shall not be mandatorily imposed upon contractual parties, 
as the parties should agree upon such matters themselves. Thus, contracting parties are not 
likely to consider environmental aspects without benefitting from it.  
 
Since the general public is becoming more aware of environmental implications of our con-
suming society, it will mirror the attitude of the commercial sector as well.
40
 At the same 
time as the green transport industry grows, the elements of sustainable transport contracts 
will become more widespread, and, most likely, will also have consequences for the con-
tractual conventions applicable to the contracts in the shipping industry.
41
 
3.2 Contract of Affreightment  
When a shipowner agrees to carry goods by sea or promise to provide a vessel for the same 
purpose, the arrangement is called contract of affreightment. Traditionally, contracts of 
affreightment are divided between charterparties and transport documents.
42
  
3.2.1 The bill of lading contract  
A bill of lading is an evidence of the terms of the contract of carriage and also functions as 
a receipt that the cargo has been shipped.
43
 The principle of freedom of contract has been 
restricted and international conventions,
44
 implemented in national legislation,
45
 regulate 
the basic obligations of the carrier towards the cargo owner.
46
  
                                                   
 
39
 Eftestøl-Wilhelmsson. 2011, p.244.  
40
 Ibid., p.245.  
41
 Ibid. 
42
 John F. Wilson, Carriage of Goods by Sea, Pearson Education Limited, Essex, 7
th
  ed., 2010, p.3.  
43
 Wilson, 2010, p.5.  
44
 Such as the Hague, the Hague-Visby and the Rotterdam Rules.  
45
 For example, FMC.   
46
 Wilson, 2010, p.6.  
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3.2.2 The charterparty contract 
A charterparty is an agreement where one party is undertaking to transport goods on their 
vessel in exchange for remuneration.
47
 The written contract shall describe the chartered 
vessel and on what conditions the contract is based on.
48
 Charterparties are normally divid-
ed into three different categories: time charters, voyage charters, and bareboat (demise) 
charters.
49
 Charterparties are as a main rule subject to freedom of contract.
50
 
3.2.3 Negotiating charterparty terms  
Charterparties are generally of an international character due to the fact that they are most 
often based on a standard form. BIMCO is a shipping association, aiming to assist its 
members by facilitating the commercial operations by, for instance, developing standard 
contract and clauses.
51
 BIMCO has produced over 100 different charterparty forms, used 
globally.
52
 Specially drafted charterparties for the Nordic market are not common, with the 
exception of the so-called Scancon charterparty, which was in use in the 1950s. However, it 
never became completely accepted by the industry
53
 and we can therefore assume that all 
standard charterparties in use in the Nordic trade have an international character. Conse-
quently, in order to find improvements for Finnish charterparties, one need to scrutinize 
international standard charterparty forms.  
 
Even if most charterparties are based on a standard form, most often these charterparties 
are subjected to changes and rider clauses. These individual charterparties have been con-
cluded under various circumstances. One crucial element is time. Time charterparties are 
more likely to be negotiated during a longer time and voyage charterparties could be agreed 
                                                   
 
47
 Rudolf Beckman, Handbok i Sjörätt, 4th edition, Åbo Tidnings och Tryckeri Aktiebolag, Åbo 1956, p. 105.  
48
 Beckman, 1956, p. 108.  
49
 Wilson, 2010, p.4.  
50
 Ibid, p.3.  
51
 BIMCO, available at: https://www.bimco.org/About/About_BIMCO.aspx , last viewed 16.07.2014.  
52
 Gorton, 2007, p.110.  
53
 Ibid.   
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upon within hours or after only a phone call.
54
 Another element is the economic power; it 
depends on the market and the current freight rates. Most often corresponding obligations 
towards the cargo interests shall be taken into account in the drafting process. Consequent-
ly, the negotiation of a charterparty is under high pressure, both due to time-related and 
economic reasons. The underlying obligations towards, for instance, cargo owners consti-
tute an additional risk for the parties.  
 
Consequently, there seems to be a need for assistance in order to implement more efficient 
solutions in the charterparties. One way to do this is to spread the knowledge of already 
drafted provisions, such as BIMCOs slow steaming clauses. Another way is to scrutinize 
practical examples and share clauses that could be useful for others as well.    
3.3 Competition law concerns  
Shipowners are in the need of assistance in order to find contractual solutions, which are 
optimized from an environmental perspective.
55
 For instance, various shipping companies 
could cooperate on developing such clauses. However, would this collaboration distort 
competition between competitors?  
 
EU competition law, with its basis in article 101 TFEU, is of importance in today’s ship-
ping industry. The regulations regarding information exchange are rather complex, and 
information exchange could have restrictive effects on competition.
56
 However, sharing 
information does not have to be an absolute threat to competition, since transparency of 
information could even lead to an increasing the competitiveness between companies.
57
  
 
                                                   
 
54
 This information has been collected during the interviews during summer 2014 at Finnish shipping compa-
nies and companies acting as charterers. Notes with the author.  
55
 Erik Røsæg, Contracts as environmental culprits, at the Sustainable Companies project, University of Oslo, 
17.12.2013, available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=96M4ajaHyPI (last visited 25.10.2014).  
56
 Directorate for Financial and enterprise affairs competition committee, Roundtable on information ex-
changes between competitors under competition law, DAF/COMP/WD(2010)118, p. 2.  
57
Alla Pozdnakova, Information exchange agreements between liner shipping companies under EC competi-
tion law, in: Eds. Antonis Antapassis, et al, Competition and Regulation in Shipping and Shipping Related 
Industries, Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2009, p.32.  
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In this case, drafting environmentally friendly standard clauses shall not be an issue from a 
competition law perspective.
58
 If the clauses are to be voluntarily implemented and the 
general public can get access to the clauses, such drafting cooperation agreements shall be 
allowed since such agreement outweighs the restriction of competition as prohibited in Ar-
ticle 101(1) TFEU.
59
 Consequently, such harmonization and coordination of the applicable 
clauses would not restrict competition. However, the parties shall not share the information 
about freight rates and similar information. Even if standardisation of contracts and infor-
mation exchange would be restricting competition, one could still argue that such a meas-
ure was needed in order to achieve efficient results, in compliance in with Article 101(3) 
TFEU.60 
 
It should not be forgotten that shipping companies are competing against each other, also in 
regards of environmental aspects. Thus, cooperation on drafting slow steaming clause 
could have negative impact on competition.
61
  
 
From my perspective, in order to avoid such competition law issues, the result from discus-
sions with charterers and shipowners will be public and not only available for a limited 
group in the industry. A stronger cooperation between shipping companies can on the other 
hand be necessary in order to increase the use of slow steaming clauses in practice.  
3.4 From a “law and economics” perspective  
When developing more efficient solutions, in respect of a more sustainable shipping indus-
try and in regards of more cost-effective contracts, the studies in the field of law and eco-
nomic can be helpful. The legal realism movement started in the 1920s and opened up legal 
                                                   
 
58
 Alla Pozdnakova has been analysing environmental standard clauses from a competition law perspective. 
Alla Pozdnakova, notes from a presentation at Norske Rederiförbundet on «mulige konkurranserettslige im-
plikasjoner av miljøsamarbeid («smart contracts») i skipsfart», 2012. Notes with the author.  
59
 The topic has been futher discussed by Sander R.W. van Hees in the master thesis ”A sustainable competit-
ion policy for Europe”, 2011, available at: 
https://www.ser.nl/~/media/files/internet/educatie/scriptieprijs/scriptieprijs_2012/van_hees_volledig.ashx, 
last visited 30.10.2014.   
60
 Pozdnakova, 2012.  
61
 Ibid.    
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scholars to social science.62 The movement later developed into the field of law and eco-
nomics at the law school in Chicago.63 When one refers to “law and economics”, the phrase 
shall be understood as the application of microeconomic analysis to legal problems. The 
movement is promoting the usage of economic reasoning when developing laws in order to 
achieve the best possibility for justifiable and reliable legal practice.
64
 For instance, Pareto 
analysis
65
 can be used in order to analyse the correlation between fuel consumption, emis-
sion, number of ships and transportation work.
66
 
 
Slow steaming has a major impact on the bunker consumption. If a vessel would reduce 
their speed by 10 %, the fuel consumption and emission would reduce by 19 %.
67
 The cen-
tral assumption in economics is that people rationally wants to maximize their own welfare. 
People are consequently adjusting in order to achieve the most efficient solution possible.
68
 
The free market consists of private parties, such as charterers and shipowners, with free-
dom of contract.
69
 The governing background law is essential for the functioning of such a 
market economy.
70
 Default rules, contrary to mandatory contract rules, are provisions in a 
contract, which the parties are free to change, but will govern the contract as long as the 
parties are silent.
71
 An example of such contract terms could be, for instance, clause 38 on 
slow steaming in NYPE 2014. Due to the potential cost of revising contract terms, by seek-
                                                   
 
62
 Edmund W. Kitch, The Fire of Truth: A Remembrance of Law and Economics at Chicago, 1932-1970, 
Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 26, No. 1 (Apr., 1983), p.164.  
63
 Kitch 1983, p.165.  
64
 Brian Edgar Butler, ”Law and Economics”, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ISSN 2161-0002, availa-
ble at: http://www.iep.utm.edu/law-econ/ (last visited 15.07.2014)  
65
 Parento was an Italian economist born in the mid-19th century and founded Parento Law.  
66
 Xu, 2014. p.4 and appendix 1. 
67
 Lars Kloch, Is slow steaming good for the supply chain? Inbound logistics, 2013, available at:  
http://www.inboundlogistics.com/cms/article/is-slow-steaming-good-for-the-supply-chain/  (last visited 
25.10.2014).  
68
 Klock, 2013.  
69
 Eds. A. Mitchell Polinsky, Steven Shavell,  Handbook of Law and Economics, Vol 1, Elsevier, Amsterdam, 
2007, p. 7.  
70
 Polinsky & Shavell, 2007, p. 7.  
71
 Ibid. p. 31.  
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ing legal advice in-house or by external service providers, re-contracting costs could be so 
substantial that the default provision would have privileging effects over others.
72
 
3.5 The current shipping sector and the need of efficiency  
After the Second World War, the dry cargo sector has experienced seven freight market 
cycles, with the average of six to seven years.73 Consequently, the shipping industry is used 
to market cycles and recessions. Nonetheless, the recession followed by the strong boom in 
the end of 2008, came as a great shock.
74
 The global financial crises and the reduced trade 
stopped the previously growing international seaborne trade.
75
 In combination with the 
decrease in demand, the supply of new vessels increased, as a result of orders made before 
the financial crises had started. Freight rates have continued to stay low and volatile as a 
consequence of the financial and economic crises in 2008.
76
 In combination with the high
77
 
and volatile bunker oil prices, carriers' earnings have been reduced to close to, and some-
times even below, the operating costs. Consequently, operators had to become even more 
cost effective in order to stay afloat. Due to the increase in bunker costs, the tanker market 
economics has completely changed.
78
 INTERTANKO propound that the total freight costs 
consists of 75 % of bunker costs. 
 
Fuel efficiency can be increased by technical optimization and revising the contracts by 
for example implementing fuel efficiency agreements.
79
  The trend has been to postpone 
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newbuilding deliveries, scrap old vessels, maximize fleet efficiency and focus on slow 
steaming.
80
  
 
INTERTANKO has developed a formula
81
 to improve the calculation of the optimal speed 
of a vessel.
82
 The optimum speed calculator is mainly intended for tankers, but according to 
analysts, this formula could also be used in the container and dry-bulk market.
83
 The for-
mula decides an optimum speed by taking into account the ratio of the freight rate to the 
fuel costs. The formula indicates that the fuel consumption is proportional to the speed with 
the power of three.
84
 However, the formula should only be used as a guide and the owners 
should adjust the speed and consumption according to the characteristics of their own ves-
sels.
85
 
3.6 Investment clauses  
Due to the contractual relationship, the charterer and the shipowner could benefit from co-
operating on long-term solutions in order to make the charterparties more efficient. For 
instance, different investment clauses could enhance the implementation of flettner ro-
tors,
8687
 instalments of frequency converters
88
 and changing propeller blades
89
, which clear-
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ly improve the fuel efficiency of a vessel. The costs of installing such technical solutions 
are normally in the hands of the shipowner, but since the instalments leads to a reduction of 
the fuel consumption, it is a direct benefit for the charterer in a time charterparty.
90
 Conse-
quently, there is challenge for the owner to find incentives to invest in more efficient tech-
nical solutions if the vessel is only chartered out on a time charter. Charterers are generally 
not willing to participate in financing more efficient technical solutions on a vessel, as they 
are of the opinion that this task shall remain with the shipowner.
91
 The picture is slightly 
different in case the shipowner and the charterer have a close relationship and the vessel 
has been contracted for a longer period.
92
 Investment clauses could then be drafted so that 
both parties would share the costs of installing more efficient technical solutions. A power-
ful charterer can demand detailed information from the shipowner about the fuel consump-
tion and thereby force the shipowners to improve their vessels in order to win a tender. 
Consequently, the charterer would benefit from lower fuel consumption, and the shipowner 
would have a more competitive vessel on the market.  
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4 NOTICE OF READINESS  
4.1 Introduction  
In order to improve the efficiency of charterparties, the focus will firstly be on a concept, 
which is used in practice and is well established. In the dry bulk segment, the most com-
mon voyage charterparty
93
 is said to be GENCON 94.
94
 As a result from collecting voyage 
charterparties from Finnish practitioners, the same conclusion could be made.  
 
Voyage charterparties normally determines when the liability for delay shift from the ship-
owner to the charterer. In GENCON 94 the point in time is determined by the laytime 
clause and when the master has given a valid notice of readiness.
95
  This concept originates 
from a time when it was not possible to exactly determine when the vessel would arrive at a 
port. Due to economic reasons, the shipowner usually performs the voyage as fast as they 
can in order to shift the risk for delay to the charterer by giving a valid notice of readiness. 
This behaviour will be referred to as the vessel is “rushing to a port” with full speed.96 Due 
to modern technology, such as AIS, the notice of readiness concept could perhaps be more 
efficient. In order to establish solutions, the system will first be scrutinized.   
4.2 Voyage charter  
A voyage charter means that a specific cargo can be transported from A to B for a specified 
price per ton.
97
  Consequently, shipowner agrees to perform one or more voyages and in 
return for freight. The freight rate is calculated per unit of shipped cargo and the shipowner 
normally pays for all the costs and consequently takes both the operational and commercial 
risk.
98
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As a result, the shipowner has the risk of delivering the vessel to the port of destination in 
time. When the master has given a notice of readiness and indicated that the vessel is ready 
to discharge, the risk is transferred to the charterer, which has the risk of loading and dis-
charging the vessel. In case the vessel has not completed the loading procedure within the 
laytime, the charterer is obliged to pay a demurrage payment to the shipowner. If the 
agreed period has not expired when the loading process is over, the charterer can some-
times submit a claim for despatch from the owner.
99
  
4.3 Laytime and Notice of Readiness  
During laytime,
100
 the shipowner is obliged to keep the vessel at the port, ready to receive 
cargo at any time. Laytime can be calculated in different ways. For instance, it can be spec-
ified in the charterparty as a number of days together with a definition of the kind of 
days.
101
 It is normal to exclude holidays and days where the weather could damage the car-
go. The parties can also determine laytime by stating a speed time for loading the cargo or 
include a “fast as can” clause.102 These types of clauses are not recommended since they 
quite often leads to disputes.  
 
When laytime has expired, the demurrage period will start and the shipowner is entitled to 
a special remuneration as a compensation for the delay.
103
 In case the discharging or load-
ing procedure is completed before the laytime period has expired, the shipowner shall pay 
an agreed amount to the charterer, called despatch.
104
 Consequently, the charterer has the 
risk of ensuring that the loading procedure is carried out within the laytime. On the other 
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hand, the shipowner has the risk of delay before laytime has commenced. In order for lay-
time to commence, generally three conditions shall be met.
105
  
 
Firstly, the vessel must have become an “arrived ship”106 at the specified port of loading.107  
The individual contract determines when the vessel has “arrived”.108 The charterparties are 
making a distinction between “berth charters” and “port charters”.  In a “berth charter” the 
vessel actually has to arrive to the agreed place of loading before laytime can commence.
109
 
Consequently, the owner bears the risk of delay in case it is not possible for the vessel to 
arrive to the agreed berth. On the contrary, in a “port charter”, the charterer shall nominate 
a berth. If the berth is not available, laytime will nonetheless commence when the vessel 
has arrived in the customary waiting area, as long as the vessel is in the port area.
110
  
GENCON 94 is an owner friendly charterparty and the charterer bears the risk of conges-
tion.
111
  In GENCON 94 a notice of readiness can be given already when the vessel arrives 
to the port, even if it has to wait outside the loading port.
112
 The Nordic Maritime Codes 
have determined that the vessel has to arrive to the place of loading.
113
 Moreover, the ves-
sel has to be ready to load the cargo and give a notice. The place of loading shall be defined 
in the charterparty.
114
 
 
Secondly, the vessel has to be ready to receive cargo.
115
 This means that the vessel has to 
be seaworthy. In addition, the vessel has to be as ready as she can be to load or discharge 
the cargo.
116
 Thirdly, the vessel has to tender a notice of readiness when the vessel ar-
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rives.
117
 Normally, a notice of readiness can only be given when the first and the second 
requirements are fulfilled. If not specially agreed, the notice does not have to be in any spe-
cial form; an oral notice of readiness could in theory be valid.
 118
  
 
When the notice has been given, the time starts to count in accordance with the specifica-
tions in the charterparty. The reason behind this system is to give the charterer, the shipper 
or the receiver time to prepare for loading and discharging. Especially in dry cargo ship-
ping, this time is of utmost importance. Before loading can commence, stevedores and cus-
toms services might be required to receive an alert.
119
  
4.4 GENCON 94; Notice of Readiness  
GENCON is globally the most used general-purpose voyage charterparty.
120
 GENCON was 
issued by BIMCO already in 1922 and since then only a few amendments have been made. 
In 1991, there was a greater support for reviewing GENCON. There was a consensus that 
the charterparty did not completely fulfil the industry’s needs in all aspects. A Study Group 
scrutinised commonly used rider clauses and alterations used by practitioners. The BIMCO 
Documentary Committee followed the Study Group’s recommendations and revised the 
charter.
121
 Thus, BIMCO issued GENCON 94.   
 
Clause 6 of GENCON 94 regulates the laytime and determines when a notice of readiness 
becomes valid.  Due to the potential efficiency improvements connected to such a clause, 
the concept shall be further analysed.  
 
The laytime clause first determines how the time shall be calculated. The parties can decide 
between either separating the loading and discharging time (a) or to calculate them together 
(b). Both alternatives state that the cargo shall be loaded or discharged within a limited 
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time during Monday-Saturdays, excluding holidays, as long as the weather permits it. The 
expression “unless used” means that if laytime has commenced, but loading or discharging 
activities are carried out outside the predetermined laytime period, such time shall count 
anyways.
122
 One of the few alterations made in the 1994 revision was that the loading and 
discharging time is now specified within a number of days/hours, compared to the previous 
version where it was only referred to hours.
123
 
 
Concerning the length of laytime, it is of great importance to specify how the days should 
be counted. It is common to either use SSHEX
124
 or SSHINC
125
 terms, but since holidays 
vary around the world, it is important to also define which holiday calendar is to be used 
for the specified charterparty. One way to specify this is to refer to the VOYLAYRULES 
93,
126
 which are not only defining the term “holiday”, but also “working days” and “weath-
er permitting day”. However, these definitions are not specifying which national holidays 
are applicable. In order to determine that, the parties can refer to BIMCO’s Holiday Calen-
dar, which is updated every year.
127
  
 
Sub-clause (c), describes the point in time when laytime actually commences. This section 
was partly revised by the BIMCO Documentary Committee in 1994. First of all, if notice of 
readiness is given up to and including 12.00 o'clock, then laytime shall subsequently start at 
13:00 o'clock. Moreover, if notice of readiness is given after 13.00 o'clock, then laytime 
shall start at 06.00 am the following working day.
128
 In practice, is quite common to change 
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sub-clause (c) in order to customise the times with the applicable ports of the voyage.
129
 
For instance, laytime could commence at 14:00 or 15:00 o'clock instead of 13:00 o'clock 
and at 08:00 or 07:00 o'clock the next working day instead of 06:00.
130
 These are however 
only small adjustments, which do not reform the existing system for giving the notice of 
readiness.  
4.5 Conclusion  
GENCON 94 provides legal certainty for the parties, due to the great amount of established 
case law. The parties are free to make alterations to the standard form and adopt a set of 
rider clauses.
131
 Consequently, what kind of alterations or rider clauses could the parties 
implement in order to make GENCON more efficient?  
 
From my perspective, it would give the master more flexibility to reduce or increase the 
speed of the vessel, if a notice of readiness could be given as late as possible during the 
afternoon and not have 13:00 o'clock as the default rule. However, in order to affect a later 
deadline, the ports need to be willing to have longer working hours. The port systems and 
the rather inflexible working hours of the stevedores, have led to an inefficient structure of 
the shipping industry. A practitioner stated during an interview that the inflexible way of 
working of the stevedores and the ports are making the Finnish export industry much less 
competitive compared to other locations in the Baltic Sea where ports generally have a 
more flexible approach.
132
 It has been suggested that, if stevedores would work in more 
flexible shifts or in other ways operate in a more efficient manner, it is more likely that 
when approaching the port vessels instead of rushing to a port, would reduce the speed 
since they have more flexibility.   
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The “rush to port” pattern derives from the contractual structure, where the difference be-
tween arriving at 11:00 and 12:30 can have major monetary consequences for the shipping 
company due to the unnecessary waiting time in the port. According to practitioners, the 
laytime and notice of readiness concept cannot be changed unless the port operations are 
changed as well. The ports are operating on demand, but on predetermined hours and con-
sequently require the early notification. It is therefore difficult to completely reform the 
notice of readiness system without involving the ports and stevedoring companies in the 
discussions. In order to change the working pattern of stevedores, the union should prefera-
bly be involved and have a positive attitude towards a reform. The Transport Workers’ Un-
ion (AKT) is representing the Finnish stevedores and as seen in June 2014, they are power-
ful and their attitude and decisions have a great influence on the Finnish export industry.
133
  
 
To conclude, even if it seems easy to increase the time span for giving a notice of readi-
ness, this will not be successful unless also the port operators are willing to become more 
flexible with their working hours. Until then, the parties can decide to incorporate virtual 
arrival agreements, which targets the unnecessary waiting time in a port when there is a 
known congestion.  
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5 SLOW STEAMING AND VIRTUAL ARRIVAL    
5.1 Introduction  
One way to increase the efficiency is to reduce the speed of the vessel, however, this is not 
a new innovation. During the 1970s, when the freight rate was low and the bunker prices 
were high,
134
 many vessels started to operate at a slower speed, a more economical speed. 
Slow steaming became popular again as a consequence the financial crisis in 2008-2009.
135
 
For instance, Maersk started slow steaming on the route between the Indian Sub-continent 
and Asia and has thereby increased the voyage time from 35 days to 42 days.
136
  
 
Operators are slow steaming generally due to two reasons, to reduce fuel costs and to cut 
emissions. Reducing speed can also be an efficient way to intentionally arrive later to a port 
of discharge due to an expected congestion. The urge to reduce speed has been a conse-
quence of a volatile market and increased bunker costs. Moreover, as a consequence of 
mandatory regulations, there might also be a need of purchasing more expensive bunker,
137
 
which additionally increased the economic burden for the operator. Slow steaming can also 
be considered as a tool to adjust a lower demand in transport and thereby continue to main-
tain a normal service, without laying up vessels.
138
 According to INTERTANKO, if the 
speed of one typical VLCC route would be reduced from the normal service speed of 14,5 
knots to the optimum laden speed of 9,7 knots, the fuel costs would be reduced from USD 
2.2 million to USD 935,000. The extension of the voyage to 49.2 days from the original 
34.5 days would not have a negative impact on the net gain for both parties.
139
 Consequent-
ly, there is a lot to gain on slow steaming. Draft clauses for both voyage and time char-
terparties have been enacted by BIMCO and will be assessed in this chapter.  
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Virtual Arrival clauses are associated with the problem of congested ports. The most com-
mon port system is the First Come First Served (FCFS) system, which determines the posi-
tion in the queue by the time of arrival of the vessel.
140
 However, this system encourages 
the vessels to proceed with full speed during the whole voyage in order not to lose unnec-
essary time. However, in busy ports, the vessel might be forced to wait in the port before 
discharge or loading can begin. This system is neither beneficial for the environment nor 
from a commercial perspective.
141
 Some ports have introduced voluntary programmes in 
order to reduce the speed of the vessels entering the ports. For example, Newcastle in New 
South Wales in Australia has introduced a Virtual Arrival Scheme
142
 to effectively manage 
congestion. Moreover, Long Beach and Los Angles is giving a 15 % discount in the har-
bour fees, if vessels are reducing the speed to 12 knots in the area of 40 nm of the port. 143 
The monetary compensation is probably the main reason why this programme has been so 
successful.   
 
The aim is not to propose alternatives to FCFS or other port incentives, but to highlight 
contractual adjustments the parties could agree to in order to increase their profit and at the 
same time reduce CO2 emissions. INTERTANKO
144
 and BIMCO
145
 have developed virtual 
arrival clauses for voyage charterparties, with the intention to balance the compensation 
between the charterer and the shipowner. It shall be clear that Virtual Arrival clauses are 
not the same as slow steaming clauses.
146
 The main difference is that Virtual Arrival claus-
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es are focusing more on instructing the master to arrive to a port at a specific time than just 
to reduce the speed of the vessel. Additionally, in order for such clauses to be successful, 
all stakeholders, such as terminal operators, port authorities, receivers and shippers, in-
volved in the voyage are required to embrace the concept.
147
     
5.2 Time charterparties  
5.2.1 Introduction  
For a shipping company that is still interested in managing the vessel, but not having the 
operational control, a time charter is preferable.
148
 The vessel can be hired out for a few 
months or years (period charter) or for one specified voyage (trip charter). The charterer 
makes the commercial decisions, but the shipowner is still responsible for employing the 
crew and paying the ordinary running costs.
149
 However, the charterer shall pay the voyage 
specific costs such as bunker, cargo handling costs and port fees.
150
 The hire is specified as 
a fixed monthly or daily payment.
151
  
 
Even if time charters are simple in theory, in practise it is more complex.
152
 The charterpar-
ty sets out the specifications of the agreement, where the speed of the vessel, cargo capacity 
and fuel consumption shall be stated by the shipowner. The charterer is not obliged to pay 
hire when the vessel is on off-hire.
153
 Consequently, the risk is divided between the parties. 
The shipowner takes the operational risk and the charterer has the commercial risk and will 
be obliged to pay hire independently if there is a demand for the vessel’s services or not.154 
 
It is common that the shipowner is obliged perform a voyage with reasonable despatch and 
not to deviate from the usual route. This has been inserted in the charterparties in order to 
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ensure the cargo owner that the goods are timely loaded and discharged. It has been dis-
cussed if due despatch can nowadays be interpreted to include both a commercial and envi-
ronmentally sound speed.
155 
 
 
As the charterer has the commercial control of the vessel, the charterer controls whether the 
vessel shall slow steam or not. In addition, since the shipowner is not responsible for pay-
ing the bunker costs and port charges, the shipowner has no economic incentive to reduce 
the bunker consumption. Thus, the owner will normally not interfere in such decisions 
since freight is payable for the complete period.
156
 However, it is of importance that the 
charterer is not abusing its power and consequently damaging the engines by instructing the 
master to reduce the speed below a recommended RPM.  In order to avoid such issues, an 
appropriate clause should be agreed upon between the parties and included in the applica-
ble charterparty.  
5.2.2 Speed and consumption  
In almost all time charterparties, there is a clause on speed and consumption, where the 
owner is guaranteeing a fuel consumption at a specified speed or RPM.
157
 In the dry cargo 
sector, the most commonly used phrase derives from NYPE 46 and states that the vessel is 
to be ”capable of steaming, fully laden, under good weather conditions about … knots on a 
consumption of about … tons of fuel”. 158 
 
In order to illustrate how a speed and consumption clause with a focus on slow steaming 
could be drafted in practise, an example has been taken from an actual charterparty.159 First 
of all, by stipulating the economic speed and the corresponding consumption, the charterer 
is informed about it and can take a calculated decision.  
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“ECO SP/CONS: 12 KNTS ON ABT 23.5 MT IFO M/E […]”160 
 
The speed and consumption clause can also specify what kind of fuel is preferred. In the 
event that the specified fuel is not available, the secondary option can be used, subjected to 
the approval of the shipowner.  
 
 “FOR IFO: RMG380 ALTERNATIVE RMH380 WHEN RMG380 IS NOT  
AVAILABLE BUT ALWAYS OBTAINING OWNERS PRIOR APPROVAL” 161 
 
Furthermore, this example also includes a reminder that the parties have to adhere to laws 
and regulations applicable to the vessel and the specific trading area.  
 
Moreover, an eco-setting/guidance was included in the clause.  The shipowner was to con-
firm that the vessel could be able to proceed at the reduced speed/RPM as has been deter-
mined, in order to avoid claims as a consequence of machinery damage. Furthermore, the 
shipowner is also under the obligation to ask their head owners for permission, in order to 
ensure that the vessel is allowed to perform at the economical speed. The speed of 12 knots 
is based on calculations made by the shipowner technical department. Finally, the last par-
agraph was included in the clause to ensure the shipowner that the charterers will not be 
able to make a performance claim against the shipowner and that the vessel’s performance 
will only be checked against the vessel’s description. Otherwise, the charterer could make 
an attempt to claim for damages due a breach of the due despatch obligation.  
5.2.3 The shipowner decides to slow steam  
In a time charterparty, the shipowner will receive the same amount of hire irrespective 
wheatear or not the vessel is slow steaming. Nonetheless, the shipowner is responsible for 
ensuring that the vessel can perform in accordance with the performance warranty, inserted 
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in the charterparty. A shipowner could perhaps be interested in slow steaming due to mar-
keting reasons. Even so, none of the standard clauses on slow steaming in time charterpar-
ties have focused on giving the shipowner the right to decide if the vessel shall slow steam.  
 
Nonetheless, there are situations where the shipowner has determined to reduce the speed 
of the vessel. The consequence of such a decision shall be analysed by assessing the Pearl 
C162 case where the shipowner took the decision to slow steam. The Pearl C case is based 
on an amended NYPE charterparty from 2006 and English law.  Due to the absence of any 
Nordic case law on this matter, it will most probably be of importance in the Nordic coun-
tries as well.
163
 In essence, the case identifies the performance warranties as the relevant 
yardstick against which one can measure slow steaming.
164
  
 
The applicable charterparty contained a performance warranty of about 13 knots, which 
was to be applied in regards of the delivery of the vessel. The voyage was to be performed 
with “utmost dispatch”165 in accordance with clause 8 of NYPE. The charterer was not sat-
isfied with the owner’s performance since the owner had reduced the speed without con-
sulting the charterer. The charterer withhold some of the hire stating that the vessel had 
underperformed due to slow steaming and consequently breached clause 8 and was there-
fore entitled to deduct hire. The tribunal did not find that there was a breach of the on-
delivery performance warranty. However, they were of the opinion that the shipowner had 
breached the “utmost dispatch” obligation and stated that the performance warranty, of 13 
knots, should be used as the appropriate benchmark for the performance of the vessel. The 
Appeal court concurred.  
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The shipowner tried to use the “error in navigation” defence in the Hauge Rules,166 which 
had been incorporated in the charterparty by the use of a paramount clause. Since the deci-
sion to slow steam was considered deliberate, the tribunal found that it was outside the 
scope of the defence. The Appeal court concurred with the tribunal’s interpretation of the 
Hill Harmony
167
 case,
168
 which in essence means that the obligation of “utmost dispatch” is 
breached if the master does not decide to take the quickest or shortest route.
169
The decision 
to slow steam was not a consequence of an error or default, since there were no heavy 
weather forecasts or any obvious mechanical problems. Consequently, the most reasonable 
explanation must be that the decision was deliberate. In result, the charterer was entitled 
compensation for loss of time.
170
  
 
The Hill Harmony case can be viewed in combination with the London Arbitration 10/00 
case, where the tribunal stated that if the ship had deliberately been slow steaming in order 
to reduce the fuel consumption, then it shall be considered as a breach of the due despatch 
obligation.
171
 Consequently, a shipowner is no longer protected from a claim by making a 
reference to the performance warranty, which is only applicable to the last part of the voy-
age and not to the complete performance.
172
   
 
To conclude, it is not recommended that a master deliberately decides to reduce the speed 
of the vessel, without agreeing upon it with the charterer.  
5.2.4 The charterer decides to slow steam  
The charterer is responsible for paying the bunker and is in control of the commercial deci-
sions. It is therefore expected that the charterer has a motivation to slow steam. If the char-
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terer wants to so slow steam, it is recommended that an appropriate clause is agreed upon 
and incorporated in the charterparty.  
 
BIMCO has drafted standard clauses on slow steaming, which can be used in order to ease 
the process of including such clause into a time charterparty.
173
 The aim was to produce a 
sustainable clause with a fair balance between the charterer’s right to control the speed of 
the vessel and the shipowner’s concerns about the consequences of slow steaming. The 
legal aspects primary relate to the shipowner’s obligations to follow the instructions to slow 
speed and at the same time make sure the instructions are not contradicting with any obli-
gations towards third parties or compromising the vessel’s safety. 174 During the period of 
this master thesis, BIMCO is in the process of publishing a new version of NYPE, the most 
common time charterparty for dry cargo shipment,
175
 where the complete slow steaming 
clause has been implemented. In the event NYPE 2014
176
 will be widely used, there is a 
need to analyse the implications and consequences of such a slow steaming clause.  
5.2.5 The BIMCO slow steaming clause implemented in NYPE 2014  
The first version of NYPE was published in 1913. Before the current revision, the char-
terparty has been revised in 1921, 1931, 1946 and in 1993.
177
 Until today NYPE 46 is still 
used by practitioners even if NYPE 93 is more common. The shipping industry does not 
change rapidly. ASBA took over and produced “ASBATIME” in 1981, however, the mar-
ket continued to use NYPE 46. As a consequence, ASBA decided to work together with 
BIMCO and FONASBA, and together the organisations undertook a general revision of 
NYPE 46 and published the 1993-version.
178
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By only briefly describing the history of NYPE, one can quite easily notice the unwilling-
ness of the industry to change to a more modern version of a standard charter party form. 
The continuous strong position of NYPE 46 can for instance be exemplified by the usage of 
the 1946 version of NYPE in the Athena case179 from 2013. Even if the 1993 version has 
not gained monopoly after 20 years in practise, there was a need of a reform.  NYPE 2014 
is currently under revision and on a good way to be adopted during 2014.
180
 The main ob-
jectives of the current revision of NYPE is to add completely new and updated versions of 
various standard clauses, as an attempt to reduce the number of rider clauses used by prac-
titioners.
181
 The early reviews have so far been extremely positive so even if changes can 
still be made, the current version shall be of great use until the final version is adopted.
182
  
 
One of the new standard clauses that have been implemented in NYPE 2014 is the 
BIMCO’s slow steaming clause. Consequently, a more thorough assessment will be carried 
out on those clauses affecting the slow steaming clause regime in order gain a better under-
standing of the functions and potential concerns the clause could have on the parties.    
5.2.5.1 Performance of Voyages - Clause 8  
 In NYPE 2014, the voyage performance is regulated in clause 8.
183
 The main rule is that 
the “Master shall perform the voyages with the utmost despatch”.184 This can be compared 
with the NYPE 93 where the term “due despatch” was used. The difference between the 
two concepts will not be further discussed since it is not likely that there will be a great 
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difference in practice.
185
 The Slow Steaming Clause is applicable to the voyage if it has 
been “ordered by the Charterers in accordance with Clause 38 (Slow Steaming Clause).”186   
5.2.5.2 Speed and Performance - Clause 12 
Clause 12 of NYPE is a performance warranty.
187
 The shipowner guarantees that the vessel 
is capable of maintaining a specified speed with a daily consumption during good weather 
conditions.
188
  There are some exceptions mentioned. The shipowner is not obliged to fol-
low the performance warranty if slow steaming is agreed between the parties or if a re-
duced speed is required due to safety reasons. Such circumstances shall be excluded from 
the performance calculations. As was stated in the discussion in section 5.2.3, in connection 
with the Pearl C-case, the performance warranty shall be used as a yardstick when the per-
formance of the vessel is disputed. In the second part of clause 12, it is stated that the char-
terer shall have the option to use their preferred weather routing monitoring system. The 
master is not obliged to follow the information deriving from the system, but the master is 
obliged to comply with the reporting procedure.  
5.2.5.3 Slow Steaming Clause - Clause 38  
The first part of clause 38
189
 describes the procedure of slow steaming. The general idea of 
the clause is that charterer has the option to instruct the Master, who is employed by the 
shipowner, to either reduce the speed of the vessel, the RPM and/or adjust the vessel’s 
speed in order to arrive at a specified time to the predetermined port. However, “specified 
time of arrival” shall not be interpreted as a warranty for the owner to arrive at a specific 
time, it shall only be considered to be an indication of the owner’s intention.190   The clause 
specifies a minimum speed the shipowner shall not deviate from; however, the minimum 
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requirement shall not be constituted as a speed order.
191
 Consequently, there is a level of 
uncertainty for the charterer regarding the time of arrival.
192
 In order to avoid uncertainty, 
the charterer’s instruction to reduce the speed of the vessel shall be submitted in writing.193 
The fact that the instruction is given in writing will probably reduce the number of dis-
putes. However, if the charterer would like to reduce the speed of the vessel, but the master 
has not received the instructions due to a technical failure, it could be unclear if an oral 
instruction would be enough to trigger a slow steaming event. Moreover, it is also unclear 
if the shipowner is liable for the extra bunker costs when the vessel was not slow steaming 
even if the charterer has given an instruction. 
 
The clause is structured in a two-tier manner, with the option of (i) “Slow Steaming” and 
(ii) “Ultra-Slow Steaming”, depending on the parties’ needs. “Slow Steaming” entails a 
speed which will not require any modifications on the engines, since the engines will con-
tinuing to operate above the cut-out point for the vessel’s engine’s auxiliary blowers. Until 
this level, the engines will not be damaged by a speed reduction. Most shipowners would 
allow reducing the speed within this “zone”.194 “Ultra-Slow Steaming” provides a slower 
speed, which allows a speed below the cut-out point for the auxiliary blowers. The engines 
might have to be modified in order successfully perform at such low speed. The first option 
is the default rule and the parties have to expressly agree in order for “Ultra-Slow Steam-
ing” to apply.195 This protects the shipowner from unforeseen engine damages.  
 
Clause 38 (a) of NYPE 2014 is subject to the Master’s right to reject instructions given by 
the charterer, in case it would be contrary to the master’s obligations in respect of the “safe-
ty of the vessel, crew and cargo and the protection of the marine environment”. Technical 
issues, connected to the engine, could also be a reason for the master to reject the request. 
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The master has an obligation to follow the manufacturers’ and designers’ recommendations 
for the engine and equipment. Consequently, the master shall refuse the charterer’s instruc-
tions to slow steam under a certain speed, if a certain speed or RPM would be outside the 
recommendations “from time to time”. “From time to time” has been included in order to 
protect the owners from unforeseen expenditures, after the date of signing the charterpar-
ty.
196
 However, the clause has not considered situations, when the vessel is no longer capa-
ble of performing at its usual speed due to a prolonged slow steaming.
197
 Consequently, an 
owner might evaluate if an express indemnity clause should be incorporated in order to 
have a better protection against possible claims due to a breach of the performance warran-
ty. 
 
Clause 38 (b) and (c) is on the other hand covering the more “soft” parts of the clause and 
not the procedure of slow steaming. In general, the owner shall operate the vessel with the 
aim to reduce the fuel consumption. Slow steaming does not have to be agreed upon before 
the commencement of the voyage, it can also be decided after departure.
198
 Moreover, even 
if it has been agreed upon that the vessel shall slow steam, all speed and consumption war-
ranties are applicable. However, if the charter has requested the vessel to reduce the speed 
below any warranted speed, it falls outside the performance guarantee.
199
  
 
The master’s obligations are further described in clause 38 (c). For instance, the master 
shall use the charter’s performance monitoring system. These devices are used in order to 
avoid any potential corruption with the vessel’s own monitoring system. Some owners can 
be reluctant towards accepting such equipment, unless the systems are restricted towards 
reporting on only the slow steaming facts.
200
 If this becomes a bigger problem, one sugges-
tion is to alter the clause and instead appoint an independent third party that is responsible 
for monitoring the performance. Clause 38 (d) is inserted in order to encourage the parties 
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to cooperate towards finding various solutions to improve the vessels energy efficiency. 
However, this is not an obligation.  
 
Clause 38 (e) states that as long as the master is exercising due diligence and following the 
charterer’s instruction, the compliance with such instruction shall not constitute a breach of 
the due despatch obligation. Moreover, clause 38 (f) obliges the charterer to ensure that the 
shipowner will not be held liable for complying with the instruction to slow steam, even if 
it would be contrary to an obligation in a bill of lading issued by the master. The preferred 
solution would be to incorporate the slow steaming clause into all bills of lading but this is 
probably not realistic due to the great amount of various stakeholders, all with their own 
standard form. Thus, it is difficult to coordinate and impose such alterations. The charterer 
shall consequently indemnify the shipowner against potential claims deriving from an obli-
gation to proceed with due despatch in a bill of lading. For liner trade, neither (e) nor (f) is 
applicable.
 201
  
5.2.6 Conclusion  
Slow steaming has been quite controversial. In regards of technical matters, slow steaming 
could cause problems since different lubricating oils might be needed and the crew might 
be in the need of training.
202
 If a vessel’s engine is not optimized for a slower speed, it 
might increase the need of maintenance. Maintenance could cause irregularities in the 
schedules and a higher demand for additional vessels during the additional maintenance 
periods.
203 
However, so far, it is the general impression among hull underwriters that slow 
steaming has not increased the frequency of main engine damages.
204
 This is probably due 
to a combination of decreased load on the engine and compliance with recommendations 
from engine makers on how to operate on reduced loads.
205
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To conclude, BIMCO’s slow steaming clause is rather long but should generally provide a 
good protection for the shipowner, as long as the indemnity clause will be accepted by the 
applicable court. Moreover, the clause is also most likely going to be welcomed by charter-
er due to the increased bunker costs.
206
 What is not regulated in the clause is a split of bun-
ker savings between the parties - an element that has been dealt with in the virtual arrival 
clauses discussed in section 5.3.4.  
 
5.3 Voyage charterparties  
5.3.1 Introduction  
In a voyage charter, the decision making power over the performance of the vessel is divid-
ed between the charterer and the shipowner. The shipowner is responsible for paying for 
the fuel and the charterer pays freight for the vessel to load and discharge at named ports. If 
the bunker consumption would be reduced, the shipowner could maybe offer a lower 
freight.  
 
The shipowner, who is in charge of paying the fuel, might be interested in slow steaming, 
but the charterer might then insist on continuing with due despatch, due to its obligations 
towards cargo owners.
207
 It is of importance to identify when the risk of delay is transferred 
from the shipowner to the charterer. Once the notice of readiness has been given, the char-
terer will be responsible for ensuring that the vessel is loaded or unloaded within the laycan 
period. If the charterer is not capable of performing in accordance with the contract, the 
shipowner is entitled to a demurrage payment. Consequently, a shipowner is eager to reach 
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the port as soon as possible in order to transfer the risk of delay to the charterer. Even if 
slow steaming would decrease the shipowner’s bunker expenses, it might not be enough.208  
 
The marginal bunker costs are normally considered to grow exponentially with the speed of 
the vessel and the demurrage rate is predetermined at a flat rate, for instance 5,000 US Dol-
lar/day. Consequently, the more the owner increases the speed, the higher the cost per hour 
saved on time total is likely to be. Thus, as long as the additional costs are less than the 
demurrage rate, an earlier arrival will lead to an increase demurrage payment and the ship-
owner will receive his money back. If the speed is above “P”, the extra bunker costs cannot 
be recovered from the increased demurrage payment. The shipowner will most likely in-
tend to find the speed P.
209
 Consequently, due to the demurrage system, the shipowner 
might perform the voyage with full speed in order to obtain a maximum benefit. The de-
murrage payment has to be taken into account when drafting slow steaming clauses.  
210
 
5.3.2 Speed and consumption  
In voyage charterparties, the rules on the vessel’s speed and consumption are generally not 
as clear as in time charterparties.
211
  Consequently, disputes regarding performance warran-
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ties are quite difficult to solve due to the absence of specific performance figures in the 
contract.
212
 An unpublished policy for slow steaming applicable for the whole shipping 
company could be the basis for claiming a breach of the due despatch obligation, unless the 
policy is brought to the attention of the charterer before the contract is signed and the poli-
cy has been reflected in the price.
213
 
5.3.3 The owner decides to slow steam  
In order not to change the normal balance between the shipowner and the charterer, the 
BIMCO slow steaming clause for voyage charterparties
214
 only entitles the shipowner to 
order the vessel to slow steam. The drafters focused on balancing the technical impact on 
the engines with the commercial need for reducing bunker costs. This clause takes into ac-
count which party is paying for the bunker costs and who is having control of the vessel’s 
movements.
215
 The shipowner is only given a restrictive freedom to reduce the speed and is 
limited to a predetermined speed. The charterer and the shipowner shall in cooperation de-
cide what the minimum speed shall be. Since it is the owner that is responsible for bunker 
costs, the charterer cannot claim the shipowner for not reducing the speed of the vessel. 
According to BIMCO, the issue of due despatch has been solved by clarifying that the de-
cision made by the shipowner to slow steam will not be a breach of any other contract. 
Consequently, the charterer is obliged to indemnify the shipowner against any claims from 
cargo owners for breach of contract as a consequence of a delay.
216
 These issues will be 
further discussed in section 5.4.  
5.3.4 The charterer decides to reduce speed   
A standard clause giving the charterer the right to slow steam has not been found, however, 
BIMCO and INTERTANKO
217
 have developed Virtual Arrival clauses, which focuse on 
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improving the efficiency of the voyage in situations where the vessel is reaching a congest-
ed port in full speed.  
5.3.4.1 INTERTANKO – Virtual Arrival Agreement / Emission Reduction Clause  
INTERTANKO’s emission reduction clause is an agreement between the shipowner and 
the charterer, with the aim to reduce the speed of the vessel and agree on a new time of 
arrival in case there will be a delay in the following port. In order to make the agreement 
attractive for both parties, the shipowner shall be compensated for the lost time, by refer-
ring to the demurrage rate. The agreement also provides for a solution where the saved 
bunker costs are shared between the shipowner and the charterer.  
 
According to INTERTANKO, it would be inappropriate to only recommend one char-
terparty clause and the parties are encouraged to develop their own clauses.
218
 INTER-
TANKO have nonetheless produced two model clauses, one intended as a pre-voyage 
agreement and the other for a post-voyage analysis.  
5.3.4.1.1 Pre-voyage agreement  
In the first version,
219
 the charterer can request the shipowner to reduce the speed to either a 
specific average speed or state that the vessel shall not arrive at the port before a specified 
time.
 
The shipowner may either; refuse such a request based on reasonable grounds or ac-
cept it by giving an estimation of the additional steaming time, specifying bunker savings 
and attach the last bunker invoice to the charterer.
220
 Thus, the advance calculation of the 
bunker savings is carried out without the involvement of a third party. The charterer can, 
based on this information, decide whether or not the estimates are acceptable. In case the 
charterer agrees, the owner will instruct the crew to follow the charterer’s request.  
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A clear benefit of this clause is that the sums are agreed upon before the decision to reduce 
the speed has been taken.
221
 As long as the estimations are not far from the reality, this sys-
tem should be an efficient way to avoid disputes. The word “estimate” could be replaced by 
“demand” in order to avoid situations where the disadvantaged party challenges the estima-
tion.
222
    
 
A potential issue connected to this clause could be the lack of definition of what constitutes 
“reasonable grounds”. Safety reasons will always constitute a valid reason to refuse to fol-
low the instructions to reduce speed. INTERTANKO suggest that a planned maintenance at 
a yard could authorise the shipowner to refuse the instructions.
223
 Even if there are indica-
tions that this will not be a problem, the scope of “reasonable grounds” could be deter-
mined more in detail by INTERTANKO.  
 
In this model clause, INTERTANKO suggest that the charterer shall compensate the ship-
owner for the additional steaming time, at the agreed demurrage rate. However, 50 % of the 
saved bunker costs shall be deducted from the compensation. Consequently, both parties 
will enjoy the benefit from the saved bunker costs. The parties can alter the percentage, but 
the default suggestion is to share 50/50.
224
  Moreover, the charterer has an obligation to 
incorporate this clause into all applicable bills of lading and shall furthermore indemnify 
the shipowner for any potential claims deriving from the application of this clause.
225
  
5.3.4.1.2  Post voyage analysis  
In the second version,
226
 the charterer is again entitled to instruct the shipowner to reduce 
the speed to a specified average speed or to determine when the vessel can arrive at a port. 
The wording differs slightly from the above clause, particularly in regards of situations 
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when the owner is entitled to reject the instruction. Similar to above, the shipowner can 
reject the instruction based on reasonable grounds, but the scope appears to be narrower 
than in the first clause. Consequently, the shipowner is only allowed to reject the instruc-
tion due to predetermined contractual obligations, or due to operational or safety reasons.
227
 
From the author’s perspective, it is not clear if the shipowner could reject an instruction 
based on commercial reasons, such as future fixtures, agreed upon either prior to the com-
mencement or during the voyage. Another difference is that the charterer can alter the in-
structions during the voyage, within the predetermined limits.
228
  
 
The bunker savings are also equally shared, and the shipowner is compensated for delay in 
the same manner as above.
229
 However, the procedure of calculating the delay is different. 
When the voyage has been completed, the master shall calculate the amount of extra time 
and the saved bunker costs. In this clause, the possibility of involving a third party has been 
suggested, and a Weather Analysis Service Provider (WASP) could calculate the total sav-
ings. During the development of the clause, some parties were criticising the use of a third 
party and there would be a risk that shipowners would not be interested in allocating the 
amount of control to a WASP.
230
  Presently, the parties are not bound to use a WASP. 
However, it has not been established whether the master’s calculations or the WASP’s cal-
culations have a superior impact, in case there are different findings.
231
 It is quite likely that 
there will be disputes between the parties, with the master/shipowner on the one side and 
the charterer/WASP on the other.  
5.3.4.2 BIMCO – Virtual Arrival Clause  
The BIMCO Virtual Arrival clause
232
 is intended to be incorporated when the shipowner is 
entitled to slow steam according to the charterparty.  The Virtual Arrival clause shall con-
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sequently be considered as a paramount clause in regards of the slow streaming clause.
233
 
The charterer is entitled to request the master to arrive at a specified time at a specified 
destination.  Contrary to INTERTANKO’s suggestions, the request shall be made in writ-
ing.
234
 Similar to the INTERTANKO clauses, the shipowner has the possibility to reject the 
instruction, but only within reasonable limits.
235
 The BIMCO clause further specifies that, 
situations where a speed reduction would affect subsequent fixtures, the charterer shall 
agree to amend the cancellation date under the voyage charterparty. As a consequence, the 
owner’s exposure is reduced, in the event the vessel arrives after the original cancellation 
date.  
 
The compensation structure is very similar to INTERTANKO’s suggestion, with 50/50 as 
the default rule. However, the payment shall be made prior to the completion of the final 
discharge.
236
 The early payment could decrease future disputes, as the parties have to agree 
on a sum at an early stage. The payment for the extra time the vessel needs in order to 
complete the voyage shall be mutually agreed. The extra time shall be calculated based on 
relevant information, such as the weather, speed, waves and technical data. In a case where 
the parties fail to agree, the parties shall mutually appoint an independent expert.
237
 How-
ever, the appointment of the expert is not connected to the dispute resolution regime under 
the charterparty. The expert decision on the extra time used shall be binding.  
 
BIMCO has identified the potential conflicting issues regarding the “utmost/due despatch” 
obligation. The problem seems to have been solved by stating that as long as the master is 
exercising with due diligence, the performance shall not breach the utmost despatch obliga-
tion. Furthermore, the charterer shall also ensure that the clause is incorporated in any 
transport documents and indemnify the owners again all potential claims, resulting from 
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more onerous liabilities than those deriving from this clause. To conclude, BIMCO has 
chosen a very similar approach as INTERTANKO.  
5.3.5 Conclusion  
It is slightly more complicated to draft speed reduction clauses for voyage charterparties 
than for a time charterparty, due to the division of the functions between the parties. In or-
der not to alter the relationship between the shipowner and the charterer, it is most likely 
preferred if it is only the shipowner that is allowed to make the decision to slow steam in a 
voyage charterparty.  
 
A Virtual Arrival clause only affect a short period of the voyage and one could question 
how large effect and impact such clauses would have on the overall picture.  Nonetheless, it 
will most likely be less controversial to incorporate a Virtual Arrival clause in to a voyage 
charterparty compared to a slow steaming clause, since both parties are most likely willing 
to adjust the speed in order to avoid a congested port. The three different clauses vary a bit, 
however, the sharing of the bunker savings 50/50 as a default rule can be found in all of 
them. As monetary disputes could arise, it might be wise to determine more in detail how 
the saved bunker costs shall be calculated or appoint a WASP or expert already before the 
voyage commences and insert the agreement into the charterparty. Even if the scope of the 
clause is limited, it will most likely have a positive effect on the communication and 
awareness of the parties on how much costs can be saved by slow steaming.  
 
5.4 Bills of lading and third party interests  
5.4.1 Introduction  
The complexity of the shipping industry can be illustrated by the uncertainty of potential 
legal claims which the carrier can be subjected to.  The cargo owner’s interests are protect-
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ed in the contract of carriage.
238
A transport document can have various forms, but the most 
common type is a bill of lading.
239
 A bill of lading acts as evidence between the carrier and 
the shipper. The carrier be the shipowner, the charterer or a freight forwarder, depending on 
who has entered into a contract of carriage which the shipper.
240
 The bill of lading becomes 
a contract when it is transferred to a third party. The third party will not be aware of the 
charterparty terms between the charterer and the shipowner,
241
 unless the terms have been 
incorporated into the bill of lading. Consequently, the bill of lading transfers from re-
ceipt,
242
 to a transport document in the hands of a third party.
243
The legal consequence of a 
bill of lading, obtained by a third party, is of particular interest since the carrier might be-
come liable towards the third party.
244
  
 
A bill of lading can be issued on behalf of the shipowner
245
 (“owner’s bill”) or on behalf of 
the charterer (“charterer’s bill”),246 however, it can sometimes be difficult to determine if it 
is a charterer’s or owner’s bill if it is not clearly indicated who has issued it.247 If it is an 
owner’s bill, the master has signed it and the shipowner could also be the contracting carri-
er in excess of being the performing carrier.  If the bill of lading has been signed on behalf 
of the charterer, the charterer is the contracting carrier and the shipowner will only act as 
the performing carrier. It varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but the general approach 
under English law is that a cargo owner is only allowed to sue the contracting party under 
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the contract, i.e. the contractual carrier.
248
 The cargo owner could also sue the performing 
carrier, but then only under tort and not under the contract. According to the various Nordic 
Maritime Codes, the performing carrier is also under the obligation to perform the voyage 
with “due despatch” and this means that the cargo owner could sue the shipowner under the 
bill of lading in case of delay.
249
 Consequently, it is important also for the shipowner to 
have control over potential legal liabilities they could be exposed to before entering into a 
virtual arrival or slow steaming agreement. 
 
5.4.2 Incorporation problem 
The main rule is that a provision in the charterparty, which is not incorporated in the bill of 
lading, cannot be invoked against a holder of a bill of lading
250
 without a reference to the 
provision.
251
 Consequently, if there have not been any indications of a slow steaming 
agreement in the bill of lading, the shipowner or the charterer might become liable towards 
the cargo owner. The purpose of an incorporation clause is to streamline the carrier’s liabil-
ities deriving from the bill of lading and in the charterparty. Courts have generally treated 
incorporation clauses with some scepticism,
252
 and it is therefore not clear if an incorpo-
rated clause will be recognised by a court.
253
  
 
In order to uniform the terms in the charterparty and the bill of lading, the charterparty 
clauses can be incorporated in the bill of lading by referring to the applicable charterpar-
ty.
254
 However, the issue is that the cargo owner rarely has access to the applicable char-
terparty.  Consequently, an incorporation is not sufficient by only making a general refer-
ence such as “charterparty terms and conditions incorporated herein” in the bill of lad-
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ing.
255
 It creates legal uncertainty for the third party holder of the bill of lading when the 
complete terms are not incorporated.
256
 The third party might not be able to see the whole 
charterparty at any point in time and courts have consequently been protecting the cargo 
owners in situations where it can be difficult for them to obtain a complete understanding 
of their legal position.
257
  
 
Courts might not recognise an incorporation clause due to mandatory legislation. Bills of 
lading are subjected to mandatory legislation, contrary to charterparties, and courts might 
not recognise an incorporation clause due the application of the mandatory rules.
258
 Bills of 
lading are most often regulated by compulsory conventions, such as the Hague-Visby 
Rules, which are implemented into national legislations. Consequently, a clause in a char-
terparty, based on freedom of contract, might not be void in a bill of lading context due to 
the country’s compulsory legislation.259 For example, clause 2 of GENCON 94, provides 
that the owner will be liable for loss only if due diligence has not been carried out personal-
ly, implying that the management of the company has acted without due diligence.  This 
clause is completely acceptable in the charterparty, but will be void in a bill of lading due 
to mandatory legislation.
260
 
5.4.3 Mandatory nature in the Nordic Maritime Codes  
In the Nordic countries, charterparties are subjected to freedom of contract
261
 and contract 
of carriage of goods, in the form of a bill of lading
262
 or sea waybill,
263
 is subjected to man-
datory legislation.
264
 The difference is clearly indicated by separating the rules into separate 
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chapters, chapter 13 is applicable to contracts for general cargo
265
 and chapter 14 to char-
terparties.
266
  
5.4.4 Due despatch  
The essential issue in regards of slow steaming is the possible infringement of “due des-
patch” in regards of third parties in contracts of carriage. In the Nordic Maritime Codes, the 
wording is almost
267
 exactly identical stating that the carrier has the obligation to “perform 
the carriage with due care and despatch”.268 Consequently, the carrier is not allowed to de-
viate from the route, is obliged to operate the ship in accordance with good seamanship and 
choose the best route possible. However, there are no applicable case law in the Nordic 
countries which determines how to strict the “due despatch” obligation shall be interpreted 
in relation to slow steaming.
269
  
 
The previously discussed Pearl C case does not deal with situations where the charterer has 
ordered slow steaming, which the default rules in the standard slow steaming clauses dis-
cussed above.
270
 Consequently, the situation is unclear. In order to improve the legal cer-
tainty for shipowners and charterers the “due despatch” obligation will be more thoroughly 
analysed.  
5.4.4.1 From the shipowner’s perspective  
It is common that a charterparty will include an express term providing that the shipowner 
has the obligation to perform the voyage with due despatch.
271
 The obligation can be ex-
pressed in various ways.
272
 Even if the charterparty does not include a specific time frame 
for the delivery of the cargo, it is assumed that the obligation shall be performed within a 
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reasonable time frame.
273
 The “due despatch” obligation, in the meaning of clause 8 of 
NYPE 1993 and 2014, would certainly mean a higher speed than what is considered to be 
economical speed.
274
 Until this point, there is a lack of case law determining if a charterer 
has the right to order a vessel to slow steam, what is a specific claim by which owners and 
charterers have so agreed.
275
  However, according to the Hill Harmony
276
 case, the charter-
er has a general right to give orders regarding the economic aspect of the voyage, leaving 
the navigational decisions to the master. Consequently, this should mean that the decision 
to perform the voyage with economical speed shall be up to the charterer, as long as the 
lower speed is not damaging to the vessel.
 
 
 
Normally, the master, on behalf of the shipowner, issues the bill of lading. The shipowner 
is then the contractual carrier and the cargo owner can go directly towards the shipowner 
and claim for damages in case of a delay. Some might argue that the shipowner would not 
be obliged to follow the charterer’s instruction to slow steam, if the reduction in speed 
would lead to a contractual breach against cargo owners. In practice, the charterer has 
promised to indemnify the shipowner against claims deriving from slow steaming, and the 
shipowner can therefore seek recourse from the charterer in such situations. In any event, it 
is probably safer for the shipowner to follow the charterer’s instructions and rely on the 
indemnity from the charterer.
277
 In order to protect himself from liabilities additionally lia-
bility, the shipowner is recommended to incorporate a complete slow steaming clause into 
the bill of lading, even if this burden is usually on the charterer, thereby reduce the risk of 
receiving claims from cargo owners.
278
 Consequently, as long as the shipowner exercises 
due diligence and complies with the charterer’s instructions, the charterer is not able to 
claim for failure of proceeding with due or utmost dispatch.
279
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5.4.4.2 From the charterers perspective  
From the perspective of the charterer, BIMCO’s standard clause is giving the shipowner 
generous rights and protection. The shipowner is given full indemnity for potential claims 
and cost incurred in connection with slow steaming, which has been ordered by the charter-
er. However, the charterer has not received any additional protection for future claims.
280
 It 
shall be remembered that the charterer has the decision making power and can therefore 
evaluate if they would like to take the risk of slow steaming or not.  
 
The Charterers P&I Club have recommended that the charterer shall include a precise pro-
vision in all bills of lading, which entails the carrier to slow steam, without it constituting a 
breach of contract. As a suggestion, the following provision could be added in the bill of 
lading, on either the front or the reverse side:  
 
The Carrier may at any time, and without notice to the shipper or receiver, use any route 
(whether or not the nearest or most direct or customary route) and proceed at any speed, 
and any delay arising therefrom shall be deemed to be within the contractual carriage and 
shall not be a deviation. 281 
 
The Charterers P&I Club is nonetheless rather sceptical if this clause would be successful 
on the spot market, it is not evident that the shipper or receiver will accept such a clause. 
Moreover, it is not sure that a court with a cargo friendly jurisdiction would accept such a 
clause in case of a dispute.
282
 
5.4.4.3 From the insurance perspective    
The insurance cover is an important aspect of the commercial decision making process. 
BIMCO and INTERTANKO’s standard clauses, generally contradicts with the “utmost 
despatch” obligation and this could constitute an issue in regards of the insurance cover.  
                                                   
 
280
 The Charterers P&I Club, 2012, p.3. 
281
 Ibid. 
282
 Ibid.  
 50 
 
According to INTERTANKO, the Virtual Arrival agreement would not affect a P&I cover 
since it is connected to an operational decision.
283
  However, they still advice charterers 
and shipowners to advice their P&I Club in case of doubt. In my opinion, due to the com-
plexity of the effects of these clauses and the various insurance covers, it is highly recom-
mended to seek for advice from a P&I insurer before implementing a Virtual Arrival clause 
for the first time. 
5.4.4.4 The way forward – a sustainable interpretation  
Norway has been examining the possibility of implementing a more environmentally 
friendly approach to slow steaming. The concept of “due despatch” has been evaluated in 
the proposal of revising the Norwegian Maritime Code.
284
 The proposal was written in 
connection with a potential implementation of the Rotterdam Rules. However, the follow-
ing suggestion can be made without implementing the Rotterdam Rules.  
 
The drafters of the Rotterdam Rules did not specifically focus on making the shipping in-
dustry more environmentally friendly.
285
 However, the members of the Norwegian drafting 
committee were more focused on the matter.
286
 Without contradicting with the Rotterdam 
Rules, the committee proposed two sections with a clear environmental approach, namely, 
the drafted version of section 261
287
 and section 278, with the effect that slow steaming as a 
general rule would be allowed.  
 
The draft Section 261
288
 added that it will be assumed that transportation of goods shall be 
planned and implemented in due regard with the environment.
289
 This addition shall for 
instance be interpreted in such a way that it does not hinder a carrier to plan a voyage with 
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the intention to reduce the CO2 emissions as much as possible, and at the same time not 
break the carrier’s obligation to carry the goods with due despatch in accordance with Sec-
tion 262.
290
 However, there are no sanctions connected to this rule.
291
 This rule is supple-
mented by the draft version of Section 278 concerning speed reduction due to the consider-
ation of the environment. 
 
The draft version of Section 278, concerning delay, corresponds with Article 21
292
 of the 
Rotterdam Rules. Only the last sentence is different.
293
 The addition entails that the focus 
has shifted and the more environmentally friendly interpretation shall be used, unless noth-
ing else has been expressly agreed between the parties. Nonetheless, the carrier will not be 
able to eliminate any liability for delays. In case the delay has nothing to do with environ-
mental concerns, the carrier will be liable for not performing the voyage with due des-
patch.
294
 The addition by the committee indicates that the least environmentally friendly 
option demands a clear and predetermined agreement in order to apply.
295
 
 
The preferred option would be that sustainable speed would be required on an IMO level 
and implemented nationally, but until then, national legislators could improve the situation 
by adjusting these rules. Consequently, Finnish legislators have the possibility to actively 
participate in process of making the shipping industry to be more sustainable by ensuring a 
more environmentally friendly interpretation in case of a conflict between the cargo owner 
and the carrier. This could be achieved by implementing a similar wording into the Finnish 
Maritime Code as has been suggested in the new proposal for a revision of the Norwegian 
Maritime Code. 
                                                   
 
290
 NOU 2012:10, p. 62.  
291
 Ibid.   
292
 Article 21: “Delay in delivery occurs when the goods are not delivered at the place of destination provided 
for in the contract of carriage within the time agreed.” 
293
The addition is the following: «Når ikke annet er avtalt, har transportøren adgang til å legge vekt på 
miljøhensyn når farten fastsettes.».  
294
 NOU 2012:10, p.242.  
295
 NOU 2012:10, p. 71.  
 52 
5.4.5 Deviation  
An additional issue to be considered is whether or not slow steaming could be considered 
as an unjustified deviation under a charterparty. A deviation is normally a geographical 
deviation where the shipowner decides to take another route than previously agreed.
296
 
However, it seems to be uncertain if slow steaming could constitute a deviation.
297
 There is 
no authority that specifically states that slow steaming would constitute a deviation.  
 
According to The Hague and Hague-Visby Rules, a deviation is only justified if it has been 
committed for saving life or property or other reasonable grounds.
298
 Most likely, a deliber-
ate deviation to slow steam for a longer period of time would not fall under the interpreta-
tion of “reasonable” in case of a dispute. 299 Consequently, if an operator or shipowner has 
committed an unjustified deviation, they risk losing their right to rely on the defences and 
limitations
300
 stated in the conventions.
301
 If this would be the case, the risk for the charter-
er would increase, both in terms of having to indemnify the shipowner and also in regards 
of the insurance cover.  
5.4.5.1 From the insurance perspective  
A deviation could have major impact since the shipowner might lose its P&I cover.
302
 The 
situation could be that deviation is not covered under the general insurance policy and an 
additional cover would have to be purchased. 
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Shipowners have tried to protect themselves by incorporating a liberty clause into their 
charterparties. A deviation clause will be interpreted restrictively.
303
 Due to the uncertainty 
if a court would accept such clause, P&I Clubs are usually rather cautious advising if the 
clause would protect the shipowner against a claim.
304
    
 
In order to improve the situation, BIMCO developed a Liberty and Deviation clause for 
contract of carriage
305
 in cooperation with the P&I Clubs. The clause states that a reasona-
ble deviation is acceptable.
306
 Reasonable shall correspond with the interpretation in Article 
4 of the Hague and Hague-Visby Rules. Thus, a deviation ordered by the charterer would 
be acceptable. In case the owner would agree to the request from the charterer to deviate, 
the charterer is obliged to indemnify the shipowner from potential claims from bill of lad-
ing holders. The Liberty and Deviation clause shall also be incorporated into all bills of 
lading and sub-charterparties. Nonetheless, the BIMCO clause does no guarantee that the 
shipowner remains insurance cover during the deviation. The shipowner might still need an 
additional insurance in order to cover the deviation. 
5.4.6 Conclusion  
The incorporation of the slow steaming clauses into bills of lading is the main issue in this 
context, due to the mandatory nature of the rules applicable to bills of lading. Consequent-
ly, due to the lack of case law on this area, the legal situation is still rather uncertain how 
far a charterer can protect himself from potential cargo by incorporating a slow steaming 
clause into a bill of lading. The practical issue is also that it will be quite difficult to incor-
porate such a clause if the other party is producing the bill of lading standard form. 
 
There are a lot of benefits connected to the implementation of the applicable clause into a 
bill of lading, however, the parties shall be aware of the potential consequences the imple-
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mentation might have. From a commercial point of view, the benefit of slow steaming is 
probably higher than the risk of facing a claim from cargo owner, but this assessment shall 
be done on a case-by-case basis.  
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6 CONCLUSION  
This thesis has focused on the possibilities of the efficiency of charterparties from an eco-
nomical and environmental perspective. Firstly, the well-known concept of notice of readi-
ness in GENCON 94, as in the most common general-purpose voyage charterparty, has 
been assessed. The negative effect of the current structure of the notice of readiness clause 
can be that vessels are forced to perform the voyage with full speed to be able to give the 
notice on time and shift the risk of delay to the charterer. The purpose of a notice of readi-
ness is to alert the ports and enable their operations. Especially before weekends and holi-
days, this system can lead to a performance of the vessel, which is neither economical nor 
environmentally friendly. However, with modern technology, it should be possible to alter 
the system and calculate the estimated time of arrival based on the position and speed of 
the vessel and consequently avoid a “rush to port”. Nonetheless, this will not be achieved 
unless port operations become more flexible.   
 
The second element that has been assessed in this thesis are various speed reduction claus-
es. Slow steaming has increased in popularity and NGOs, such as INTERTANKO and 
BIMCO, have produced standard clauses that the parties can insert in their applicable char-
terparty. The fact that the slow steaming clause has been incorporated in NYPE 2014 indi-
cates that slow steaming is requested by both charterers and shipowners. A subsequent de-
velopment has been to draft an agreement on speed reduction in the event that there is a 
known port congestion.  The Virtual Arrival clauses are only focusing on a very limited 
segment but the system is most likely going to be successful for both parties.  
 
Before implementing slow steaming clauses into a charterparty, the parties have to consider 
several aspects in order to avoid undesired consequences. The parties shall clearly deter-
mine shipowner’s obligations in order to avoid uncertainties during the voyage. The master 
shall be confident and fully aware of the required conditions to be fulfilled before the mas-
ter’s obligation to slow steam has been triggered. One element could be that the master 
shall receive the instruction to slow steam in writing. Moreover, the clause shall clearly 
define when the shipowner has the right to refuse such an instruction. The parties could for 
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instance define more clearly the meaning of the expression “reasonable grounds” in order 
to ease the decision making process for the master. In the event there are clauses conflict-
ing with the speed reduction clause, such clauses shall be identified and the matter shall be 
solved before the voyage commences. Performance warranties and due despatch obliga-
tions in the charterparty shall be given special attention. The clause shall be incorporated in 
all applicable bills of ladings. Moreover, the shipowner is recommended to demand an in-
demnity from the charterer. The purpose of incorporating an indemnity clause is to protect 
the shipowner from any loss and liabilities the shipowner could suffer as a consequence of 
reducing the speed on the charterer’s request. The economic benefit from reducing the 
bunker consumption is of essence. However, it is a challenge to divide the economic bene-
fits between the charterer and the shipowner and this element has been missing in the slow 
steaming clauses discussed in this thesis. Inspiration for such additions can be taken from 
the Virtual Arrival clauses.  
 
The greatest challenge of slow steaming is the potential conflict in regards of the due des-
patch obligation, deriving from mandatory legislation. The cargo owners have a strong pro-
tection in the Nordic Maritime Codes. Both the contracting and the performing carrier has 
an obligation to deliver the goods with due despatch. Consequently, both the performing 
and the contracting carrier risks facing claims from the cargo owners. Moreover, an indem-
nity clause will most likely not protect the carrier against claims for cargo damage as a re-
sult of delay. Consequently, slow steaming is preferred in trades where a delay will not 
have an effect on the quality of the goods. Environmental issues should become more im-
portant in the legislative process of international carriage of goods. However, the mandato-
ry rules still have to enable a sound market for the shipping companies and charterers. In-
ternational conventions are changed in a slow speed. Consequently, national legislators 
should focus on improving the legislation in order to enable slow steaming. By ensuring 
that the more sustainable interpretation of the performance of the voyage by way of the 
default rule, carriers would probably be more willing to slow steam, also after the end of 
the recession and when the bunker costs are no longer the main argument for slow steam-
ing.  
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8 APPENDIX 
8.1 Appendix A – GENCON 94; clause 6 
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8.2 Appendix B – Eco speed and consumption clause  
SPEED/CONSUMPTION M/E G/E 
----------------- ----- ------ 
ABT 14.0 KNTS ON ABT 30.0 MT + ABT 1.5 MT IFO (380 RMG) BALLAST ABT 14.0 KNTS ON ABT 
32.0 MT + ABT 1.5 MT IFO (380 RMG) LADEN 
 
ECO SP/CONS: 12 KNTS ON ABT 23.5 MT IFO M/E + 1.5 MT IFO G/E - BALLAST 
'' 25.5 '' - LADEN 
 
DURING EXCHANGE OF BALLAST AT SEA: ABT 3.0 MT IFO (380 RMG) 
 
CONSUMPTION IN PORT 
------------------- 
IDLE : ABT 2.5 MT IFO (380 RMG) + ABT 0.1 MDO PER DAY 
GEAR WORKING: ABT 5.5 MT IFO (380 RMG) + ABT 0.1 MDO PER DAY 
 
SPEED/CONSUMPTION IS GIVEN AT DESIGN DRAFT AND BASIS EVEN KEEL, CLEAN HULL, 
CLEAN FUEL AND GOOD WEATHER/SEA CONDITIONS WITH WINDS NOT EXCEEDING BEAU-
FORT SCALE 4 AND/OR DOUGLAS SEA STATE 3 AND NOT AGAINST ADVERSE CURRENTS 
AND NEGATIVE INFLUENCE OF SWELL. 
 
VSL HAS THE OPTION TO USE MDO IN MAIN ENGINE FOR MANOEUVRING, ENTERING OR 
LEAVING PORTS, SAILING ON CONFINED WATERS, RIVERS, CANALS, ESTUARIES, AS WELL 
AS DURING ENGINE STAND BY PERIODS. 
 
BUNKERS SUPPLIED MUST MEET ISO 8217:2010 INTERNATIONAL STANDARD AND ANY SUB-
SEQUENT REVISION THEREOF ASLO MUST COMPLY WITH ANNEX VI OF MARPOL 73/78 
AND/OR ANY RELEVANT EUROPEAN UNION DIRECTIVE. BIMCO'S 'BUNKER FUEL SULPHUR 
CONTENT CLAUSE FOR TIME CHARTERS' TO APPLY. 
 
FOR IFO : RMG380 ALTERNATIVE RMH380 WHEN RMG380 IS NOT AVAILABLE 
BUT ALWAYS OBTAINING OWNERS PRIOR APPROVAL. 
FOR MDO : DMB 
 
ALL DETAILS AND FIGURES, INCLUDING THE SPEED/CONSUMPTION ONES, ARE GIVEN BASIS 
'ABOUT'. 
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ECO-SETTINGS/GUIDANCE 
--------------------- 
OWNERS CONFIRM VSL CAN PROCEED AT REDUCED SPEED/RPM AS PER DESCRIPTION. 
OWNERS HAS PETITIONED HEADOWNERS THAT THE VSL TO STEAM AT THE BELOW FIG-
URES BASED ON CALCULATIONS FROM OWNERS TECHNICAL DEPT. 
 
ECONOMICAL 
SPEED = ABT 12 KTS 
CONSUMPTION = ABT 18,5 MT + ABT 1,5 MT IFO - BALLAST 
ABT 20,0 MT + ABT 1,5 MT IFO - LADEN RPM =90-92 WOG AND BASIS ON ABOVE CHRTRS WILL 
NOT MAKE PERFORMANCE CLAIMS, THE VSL'S PERFORMANCE TO BE CHECKED BSS THE 
VSL DESCRIPTION ONLY. 
 
8.3 Appendix C – NYPE 2014; clause 8, 12 and 38 
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8.4 Appendix D - Emissions Reduction Clause – pre-voyage agreement 
1. Charterers may request Owners to reduce speed during the laden voyage to a specified average 
speed or to arrive at the discharge port not before a specified date.  
2. Owners may: 
 (i) refuse such requests on reasonable grounds, including but not limited to existing contractual 
obligations, or for operational or safety reasons, or 
 (ii) provide Charterers with estimates of additional steaming time, and reduction in bunker con-
sumption, together with the invoice cost of the last bunkers supplied. If Charterers agree Owners' 
estimates prior to any commencement time provided by Owners, Owners will instruct the vessel to 
comply with Charterers' request. 
3. For the avoidance of doubt, Charterers may make further requests in accordance with sub-clause 
1 above at any time before or during the course of the voyage. 
4. Charterers shall pay for the additional steaming time at the demurrage rate, less 50% of the bun-
kers saving both as set out in Owners' estimates under sub clause 2. Payment to be made against 
Owners' invoice together with freight. 
5. Charterers shall incorporate this provision in all Bills of Lading and shall indemnify Owners in 
respect of all claims against Owners arising from compliance with the Charterers' requests under 
sub clause 1. above. 
 
8.5 Appendix E - Emissions Reduction Clause – post voyage analysis 
 1. Charterers may instruct Owners to reduce speed during the laden voyage to a specified average 
speed or to arrive at the discharge port not before a specified date, subject to Owners' consent, 
which is not to be unreasonably withheld. It shall be reasonable for Owners to withhold consent due 
to, inter alia existing contractual obligations, or for operational or safety reasons. 
2. Charterers may instruct Owners to further vary the performing speed (subject to the limit of the 
vessel's service speed) at any stage during the voyage. Any further reduction of the speed shall be 
subject to Owners' consent in accordance with Sub-clause 1. 
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3. Charterers shall compensate the Owners for all extra steaming time at the demurrage rate. Any 
bunker savings shall be shared 50/50 between Owners and Charterers. 
4. The bunker invoice price from the last bunkering shall be used to calculate the bunker savings. 
Any such savings may be deducted from the compensation payable for extra steaming time or shall 
be reimbursed by Owners if no such deduction has been made. 
5. Following completion of the voyage, the Master shall calculate the extra steaming time and any 
bunker savings arising from Charterers' instructions and present his calculations to Charterers.  
6. If Charterers instruct a Weather Analysis Service Provider (WASP) Owners shall provide the 
WASP with such information as the WASP may reasonably require for its calculations.  
7. Charterers shall incorporate this provision in all Bills of Lading and shall indemnify Owners in 
respect of all claims against Owners arising from compliance with the Charterers' instructions under 
this clause. 
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8.6 Appendix F – BIMCO Virtual Arrival Clause for Voyage Charter Parties  
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8.7 Appendix G – Liberty and Deviation Clause for Contracts of Carriage  
 
